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MITIGATING RISK, ERADICATING SLAVERY
RAMONA L. LAMPLEY*
For U.S. companies with forced labor or child labor in the supply chain,
litigation is on the rise. This Article surveys the current litigation landscape
involving forced labor in the supply chain. It ultimately concludes that
domestic corporations that source from international suppliers should adopt
the Model Contract Clauses drafted by the ABA Business Law Section
Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply
Contracts (“Working Group”). This Article traces the origins of cases
involving supply chain forced labor, beginning with the early employee
negligence cases that form the backdrop of existing case law and the
cornerstone of the Model Contract disclaimers. Part III turns to the evolving
consumer class actions based on deceptive trade practices. Part IV addresses
the complexities of employee-based cases alleging violations of the ATS, and by
comparison, this Part also illustrates why the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) extraterritorial jurisdictional grant may

* Ramona L. Lampley is a Professor of Law at St. Mary’s University School of Law
in San Antonio, Texas. She teaches sales, secured transactions, civil procedure,
modern litigation practice, e-discovery, and commercial paper. Professor Lampley has
been published in the Washington Law Review, BYU Law Review, Cornell’s Journal of Law
and Public Policy, and ESSENTIALS OF E-DISCOVERY. Professor Lampley is chair of the
Article 2 subcommittee of the ABA’s Business Law Section UCC Committee. She is also
a member of the Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International
Supply Contracts and co-author of TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: CONSUMER RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES (West 2019). She owes deep gratitude to Randy Jeffries and Katina Zampas
for their thorough research and deep concern over the issues discussed in this piece.
She also would like to thank David Snyder and Susan Maslow for spear-heading the
Working Group, Chris Johnson for providing her with initial research leads, all
members of the Working Group for providing a platform where this work has come to
fruition, Stephen Ware and Christopher Drahozal for their detailed comments, and the
members of the University of Kansas School of Law faculty who provided thoughtful
feedback and a warm forum for discussion. Finally, the author thanks Nicholas T.
Hillman and the members of the American University Law Review for hosting the
symposium and for their diligent work in publishing this set of works.
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provide fertile ground for domestic litigation involving foreign forced labor in
the supply chain. Finally, Part V discusses the origin of the disclaimer clauses
in the MCCs proposed by the Working Group, and the arguments in favor of
using the MCCs as a foundation for reducing abusive labor practices in the
supply chain, even for those brought under the TVPRA. The Article concludes
that the threat of domestic liability is on a steady upward trajectory, and
businesses are well-advised to begin incorporating contractual rights and
remedies to deal with the problem of forced labor in the supply chain, but in a
way that does not increase the potential for domestic liability.
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I. FORCED LABOR IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN?
DOMESTIC RETAILERS BEWARE
Domestic retailers beware. Is there forced labor or slave labor in
your supply chain? If so, your vulnerability as a target for litigation is
on the rise. Recent changes in federal law make it more likely that
such causes of action, whether brought by an individual or as a class,
will be successful. Consider the consumer who buys a bag of
chocolate for distributing to her neighborhood children on
Halloween. Would that person have bought the same chocolate had
she known it was the product of child labor? Is that a material fact
that ought to have been disclosed to the ultimate purchaser, much
like an ingredient that now taints the product? Should the
manufacturer bear civil liability to consumers for failing to disclose
the probability of child labor in its supply chain, even if it did not
force the hand of the laborers?1 It is no stretch to say that some
states’ consumer protection laws, at a minimum, prohibit giving a
false impression that one sells ethically sourced products.2
Forced labor in the United States is illegal.3 It exists, but it is
heavily regulated, at least in comparison to other developing
1. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 1:18-cv-10360
(D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2018), 2018 WL 1051865; Class Action Complaint, Tomasella v.
Mars, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10359 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2018), 2018 WL 1051861; Class
Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10269 (D. Mass. Feb.
12, 2018), 2018 WL 823151. See generally Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016
(N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173
F. Supp. 3d 954 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.);
Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 460
(9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); see also Wirth v. Mars, Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx),
2016 WL 471234 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018)
(mem.); Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 15, 2016), amended by 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 731 F.
App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954
(C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.).
2. See Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2016 CA 007731 B, 2016
WL 4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016) (holding that under Washington D.C.’s
Consumer Protection Procedures Act, in-depth descriptions and detailed statistics of the
supplier auditing process can influence the reasonable consumer’s purchasing decisions
and give rise to an actionable false impression); see also infra Section III.A.
3. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008 (TVPRA), Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.). Under the TVPRA, forced labor means
providing or obtaining labor or services by force, physical restraint, serious harm, or
threats of such; by abuse of the law or legal process, or threats of such; or by “any
scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person
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countries.4 The problem is heightened when domestic entities
acquire products or supplies from an international supply chain
because labor is subject to a different set of rules and regulations,
which may not be enforced.5 Some of the inexpensive products we
buy come with a cost, a cost unknown to many of us. Domestic
litigation is about, in part, exposing those external costs. In 2016,
Professor David Snyder formed the Working Group to Draft Human
Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts (“Working
Group”), a part of the ABA Business Law Section.6 In the early stages
of the Working Group, I was asked to research domestic litigation, in
whatever form, involving the use of forced labor in the supply chain.
We began with one case: Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp.7 But in the
months and weeks that passed, the amount and complexity of the
litigation involving these issues escalated. Research revealed an
increasing mass of consumer class actions brought by those who were
defrauded by the knowing, or at best, willfully ignorant use of forced
labor in the supply chain. At the same time, viable legal theories
did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer
serious harm or physical restraint.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a)(1)–(4) (2012). My use of
“forced labor” in this piece includes both this definition in the TVPRA and slave
labor. In contrast, using the term child labor invites a conversation as to whether it is
illegal or legal child labor and under which jurisdiction’s laws. That discussion, while
meritorious, is beyond the scope of this piece. The use of the term “child labor” in
this piece is based on an understanding that the labor practices involved would
violate social norms and, at a minimum, U.S. labor laws.
4. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (imposing severe criminal penalties and civil liability for
those who engage in forced labor practices); see also Forced Labor, END SLAVERY NOW,
http://www.endslaverynow.org/learn/slavery-today/forced-labor (last visited June 1,
2019) (detailing the prevalence of forced labor in the United States). Cf. Free the
Slaves and the Human Rights Center of the University of California, Berkeley, Hidden
Slaves Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 47 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Galit A. Sarfarty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 419, 423 (2015) (explaining the challenges with regulating multi-national and
multi-tiered supply chains through domestic regulations).
6. Additional commentary by members of the Working Group on international
supply chains and the MCCs can be found in this symposium issue. See generally E.
Christopher Johnson Jr. et al., The Business Case for Lawyers to Advocate for Corporate
Supply Chains Free of Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1555 (2019);
David V. Snyder, The New Social Contracts in International Supply Chains, 68 AM. U. L.
REV. 1869 (2019); see also Jennifer S. Martin, Private Law Remedies, Human Rights, and
Supply Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1781 (2019); Jonathan C. Lipson, Something Else:
Specific Relief for Breach of Human Rights Terms in Supply Chain Agreements, 68 AM. U. L.
REV 1751 (2019). But see Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights: Looking to
Version 2.0 of the ABA Model Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519 (2019).
7. No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016).
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brought by employees of foreign suppliers were developing under the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)8 and
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).9 The research revealed that many
businesses would benefit from a model agreement designed to
warrant against the use of forced labor in the supply chain and
address remedies for breach.
In 2018, the work of the Working Group came to fruition with the
publication of Model Contract Clauses (“MCCs”) for domestic buyers
to use in their international purchase agreements to guard against
the use of forced labor in the supply chain.10 Every domestic company
that sources from international entities should consider adopting the
MCCs in some form.11 David Snyder and Susan Maslow have discussed
the MCCs in their work, Human Rights Protections in International Supply
Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk.12
This Article discusses the emerging trends in domestic litigation
involving forced labor in the supply chain and how the disclaimers
that appear in MCCs were drafted with the intent of reducing
litigation risk for the domestic entities that adopt them. Recent
litigation against domestic retailers of goods involving alleged human
trafficking in the supply chain generally falls into two areas:
employee cases and consumer deceptive advertising cases. Part II of
this Article traces the origin of these cases beginning with the early
employee negligence cases that form the backdrop of existing case
law and the cornerstone of the Model Contract disclaimers. Part III
turns to the evolving consumer class actions based on deceptive trade
practices. Part IV addresses the complexities of employee-based cases
alleging violations of the ATS, and by comparison, this Part also
illustrates why the TVPRA extraterritorial jurisdictional grant may
8. Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The ATS, enacted in 1789, provides: “The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id.
10. David Snyder & Susan Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International Supply
Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk: 2018 Report and Model Contract
Clauses from the Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply
Contracts, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093 (2018) [hereinafter Model Contract Clauses].
11. Cf. E. Christopher Johnson Jr., Business Lawyers Are in a Unique Position to Help
Their Clients Identify Supply-Chain Risks Involving Labor-Trafficking and Child Labor, 70 BUS.
LAW. 1083, 1102–03 (2015) (encouraging businesses to adopt the ABA’s Model
Principles for Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, including supply chain monitoring).
12. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1093.
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provide fertile ground for domestic litigation involving foreign forced
labor in the supply chain. Finally, Part V discusses the origin of the
disclaimer clauses in the MCCs proposed by the Working Group, and
the arguments in favor of using the MCCs as a foundation for
reducing abusive labor practices in the supply chain, even for those
brought under the TVPRA. The Article concludes that the threat of
domestic liability is on a steady upward trajectory, and businesses are
well-advised to begin incorporating contractual rights and remedies
to deal with the problem of forced labor in the supply chain, but in a
way that does not increase the potential for domestic liability.
Some may claim that the MCCs go too far in protecting domestic
entities, which often wield all or most of the bargaining power with
their international suppliers. This may be so, but the goal at this
point is to persuade domestic entities to adopt and enforce the
contractual agreements in an effort to eradicate forced labor in the
supply chain.13 Companies would be hard-pressed to adopt a contract
that could open them up to liability in the form of duty assumption
or control. Therefore, the disclaimers that are part of the MCCs
protect, rather than make vulnerable, adopting companies from
more liability than they would face otherwise.14
Overall, domestic litigation over forced labor has met with limited
success until very recently, although some cases discussed in this
piece are pending appeal. But the act of asserting these cases, as in
the California “chocolate” cases, attracts media attention and influences
the domestic consumer market for these products. From a marketing
standpoint, domestic manufacturers and retailers should be concerned
about the market effect of these supply-side human trafficking cases.
From a litigation risk perspective, developments in the extraterritorial
reach of the TVPRA could prove to be extremely problematic for any
company with reckless indifference to forced labor in its supply chain.
II.

WORKERS’ NEGLIGENCE-THEORY CASES

This section describes some of the fundamental cases behind the
Model Contract Disclaimers—those brought by the workers against
domestic purchasing companies alleging negligence in failure to

13. See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 747, 792 (acknowledging that “[p]rivate regulation through corporate codes of
conduct and monitoring may actually be the only way that labor and environmental
conditions are addressed in some developing countries”).
14. Id. at 1095, 1105.
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prevent labor abuses in their supply chains. These early cases formed
the building blocks for current employee cases.
A.

Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp.

Our research began with a factory collapse, a humanitarian
tragedy, and a lawsuit. On April 24, 2013, an eight-story commercial
building that housed multiple garment factories in Bangladesh
collapsed, killing over 1000 and injuring over 2500 people. Many
victims were female workers and children.15 An engineer inspected
the building the day before the collapse and declared it unsafe.16 In
Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp.,17 the plaintiffs filed a class action on
behalf of other workers and those who died in the collapse against
domestic retailers J.C. Penney, The Children’s Place, and Wal-Mart.18
The plaintiffs alleged negligence and wrongful death in the domestic
retailers’ failing to monitor their Bangladeshi clothing suppliers.19
The complaint further alleged the retailer defendants knew of the
unsafe working conditions in Rana Plaza and breached their duty to
the suppliers’ workers by failing to “implement standards and
oversight mechanisms designed to ensure the health and safety of
workers who manufactured clothing for their stores.”20
The Delaware Superior Court dismissed the claims on two
grounds.21 First, the court held the claim was barred by the
Bangladeshi one-year statute of limitations.22 Although the court
could have resolved this case on the statute of limitations issue, it
went on to render a decision on the negligence claim.23 The court
likely resolved the negligence claim to set a precedent for supply-side
human trafficking cases based on a tort duty to monitor.
The court held the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligence
because the retailer defendants had no duty to monitor factory
15. Id.; see also Complaint ¶ 3, Rahaman v. JC Penney Corp., No. 1:15-cv-00619
(D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Rahaman Complaint].
16. Rahaman Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 3.
17. No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016).
18. Id. at *1. The complaint was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, and it named Bangladesh as a defendant. See Rahaman
Complaint, supra note 15. The plaintiffs withdrew the case from federal court and
refiled in Delaware Superior Court.
19. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *1.
20. Rahaman Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 5–6.
21. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *7, *10.
22. Id. at *7.
23. Id. at *10.
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conditions.24 Under Delaware law, “[i]n negligence cases alleging
nonfeasance, or an omission to act, there is no general duty to others
without a ‘special relationship’ between the parties.”25 The plaintiffs
argued they—as workers—fell within an exception to this no-duty
rule because they were employed as independent contractors for the
defendant.26 Under the peculiar risk doctrine, an employer of an
independent contractor is subject to liability when an independent
contractor is hired to do work the employer should see is likely to
create a peculiar risk of harm without special precautions.27 The
court rejected this argument for several reasons.
The court first rejected the existence of a duty on behalf of the
retailer defendants because there were no allegations establishing a
“peculiar risk.”28 “The risk contemplated by the doctrine is ‘peculiar
to the work to be done, and arising out of . . . the place where it is to
be done, against which a reasonable [person] would recognize the
necessity of taking special precautions.’”29 The court held that
inadequacies in the construction of Rana Plaza were not peculiar to
the business in which the defendants engaged, and the defendants
could not reasonably be expected to take precautions against a
building collapse when sourcing garments from Bangladesh.30
The court also held the peculiar risk doctrine did not apply to this
class of plaintiffs because they were employees of the garment
factories, not of the defendants.31 Under Delaware statutory law, “[an]
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm
caused to another by an act of omission of the contractor or his
servants.”32 In other words, the defendants were shielded from liability
because they indirectly acquired the goods from the supplier.
There are exceptions to the general rule that a contractor does not
have a duty to protect an independent contractor’s employees from
24. Id. at *9.
25. Id. at *8; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
There is no duty to act for the protection of a third party unless there is a special
relationship. A special relationship exists between socially recognized relations such
as parent and child, employer and employee, and innkeeper and guest. §§ 314–15.
26. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *8.
27. Id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413.
28. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *9.
29. Id. at *8 (quoting Bryant v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., No. 89C-08-070,
1995 WL 653987, at *1, *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1995)).
30. Id. at *9.
31. Id. at *8.
32. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409.
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foreseeable hazards. The exceptions exist “when the general contractor;
(1) actively controls the manner and method of performing the contract
work; (2) voluntarily undertakes the responsibility for implementing
safety measures; or (3) retains possessory control over the work premises
during work.”33 The court held that none of these exceptions applied
because the retail defendants’ only contact with the garment factories
was through indirect sourcing.34 Because the defendants did not undertake
any safety responsibilities and did not control the work being done, these limited
exceptions to the no-duty rule did not apply.35
The plaintiffs also made a basic foreseeability argument,
contending the defendants were aware of the long history of injuries
and fatalities due to the poor working conditions.36 But the court
held that even if the defendants knew or should have known of the
risks at the garment warehouse, knowledge would not establish a duty
of care when the defendants had neither asserted control over the
work nor assumed responsibility for safety measures.37 The court also
rejected the somewhat tangential argument that the defendants’
ethical sourcing statements established a duty of care.38
Finally, the plaintiffs argued the defendants owed a duty of care under
the illegal-conduct exception, which “imposes liability on the employer of
an independent contractor where ‘the employer causes or knows of and
sanctions illegal conduct.’”39 The court found no evidence that the
plaintiffs were required to engage in illegal conduct to manufacture the
garments and no provision in the supply contracts to source garments
from factories in which the work was performed illegally.40
Thus, the court resoundingly rejected all arguments that the retail
defendants, as remote purchasers, owed a duty to the suppliers’
employees, even if the retail defendants had knowledge of unsafe
working conditions.41 The plaintiffs did not appeal.
33. Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *9.
34. Id.
35. Id. Note the importance of this conclusion in terms of the contractual
disclaimers discussed infra Part V. From the drafting perspective, it will likely be
important to purchasing entities that any contract does not establish the control or
responsibility that would meet these exceptions.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Colon v. Gannett Co., No. 180, 2013, 2013 WL 5819666, at *1
(Del. Oct. 28, 2013)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at *10.
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B. Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In reaching the “no duty” decision in Rahaman, Judge Johnston relied
on the decision in Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Doe I”),42 which bears
important implications for any company faced with potential forced labor
in the supply chain. In Doe I, the plaintiff-employees of foreign companies
filed a class action against Wal-Mart alleging Wal-Mart had breached its
supplier code of conduct (“Standards for Suppliers”) in failing to
adequately monitor and correct the unsafe working conditions of its
suppliers.43 The standards were incorporated into supply contracts with
foreign suppliers.44 They required the suppliers to “adhere to local laws
and local industry standards regarding working conditions like pay, hours,
forced labor, child labor and discrimination.”45 The contracts also
included a right to unannounced inspections.46
The plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart knew its suppliers often violated the
Standards and did not adequately monitor the working conditions.47
They also alleged the short deadlines and low prices in Wal-Mart’s
supply contracts actually force suppliers to violate the Standards to meet
the terms of the contract.48 The plaintiffs advanced four theories of
liability: (1) they were third-party beneficiaries of these standards; (2)
Wal-Mart was a joint employer; (3) Wal-Mart negligently breached a duty
to monitor suppliers’ working conditions; and (4) Wal-Mart was unjustly
enriched by the plaintiffs’ mistreatment.49
Following district court dismissal for failure to state a claim, the
plaintiffs appealed.50 The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the
standards did not create a third-party beneficiary cause of action
because it only gave Wal-Mart the right to inspect the suppliers, not a
duty to inspect them.51 Although the contract imposed consequences
on the supplier for failure to comply with inspections—potential
cancellation or loss of business—there were no comparable adverse
consequences that would inure to Wal-Mart for failure to inspect.

42. 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
43. Id. at 679–80. The employees were from suppliers based in China,
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Swaziland, and Nicaragua.
44. Id. at 680.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 681.
50. Id. at 679–80.
51. Id. at 681–82.
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Thus, the court held that Wal-Mart made no promise to monitor, and
no such promise flowed to the plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries.52
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that they could sue
Wal-Mart based on the suppliers’ breach of the contractual duty to
maintain certain working conditions because a donee third-party
beneficiary may only recover against the promisor, not the promisee.53
Whether Wal-Mart was an “employer” of the foreign employees
hinged on whether Wal-Mart had a right to control and direct
activities of the supplier, or the manner and method in which the
work is performed.54 Citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly55 and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal,56 the court held the plaintiffs provided no factual allegations
that Wal-Mart exercised day-to-day control over operations.57
Further, the court held that supply contract terms such as deadlines,
quality of products, and price do not constitute sufficient day-to-day
control over a supplier’s employees as to create an employment
relationship between the purchaser and the supplier’s employees.58
The Ninth Circuit also held that Wal-Mart did not owe the plaintiffs a
common-law duty to monitor its suppliers or prevent the plaintiffs’
mistreatment.59 This “no duty” holding was based on (1) the absence
of a contractual duty, as discussed above; (2) the absence of factual
allegations that Wal-Mart exercised significant control over work
conditions and affirmatively contributed to the plaintiffs’ injuries;
and (3) the court’s rejection of a common-law duty to monitor
suppliers to protect their employees.60
The court also rejected the unjust enrichment claim because there
was no prior relationship between the plaintiffs and Wal-Mart.61 The
plaintiffs argued that Wal-Mart was unjustly enriched by profiting
from its relationships with suppliers at the plaintiffs’ expense.62 But,
according to the court, “a party generally may not seek to disgorge
another’s profits unless a ‘prior relationship between the parties’” gave

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 682.
Id.
Id.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Doe I v. Wal-Mart, 572 F.3d at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 685.
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rise to the unjust benefit.63 The court had already held that Wal-Mart
did not exert control over the plaintiffs and was not the employer. It
observed that there is no “plausible basis upon which the employee of a
manufacturer, without more, may obtain restitution from one who
purchases goods from that manufacturer.”64
Doe I provides a useful guide in tailoring the MCCs to one’s own
business needs to avoid unintentionally exposing the business to
domestic liability (for the acts of its supplier) through assumption of
control over that supplier.65 Even under Wal-Mart’s Standards for
Suppliers, which imposed a supplier obligation to provide local
industry-standard working conditions and gave Wal-Mart a right of
inspection, the court found no contract, tort, or equitable cause of
action. The false advertising cases take a different strategy to supplyside human trafficking instances.
III. CONSUMERS’ FALSE ADVERTISING CLAIMS BASED ON FAILURE TO
DISCLOSE ABUSIVE LABOR PRACTICES IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN
Another set of cases involving abusive labor practices in the supply
chain assert consumer protection claims, usually class claims, for false
advertising against domestic retailers. Most recently, plaintiffs have
filed deceptive advertising and unjust enrichment cases in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on forced
labor in the supply of domestic chocolate.66 Another very recent case
63. Id. (quoting Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004)).
64. Id.
65. Sometimes, the level of control or inspection is not entirely up to the domestic
entity. For instance, the Federal Acquisitions Regulations (“FAR”) governs government
contractors. FAR 52.222-50(h), Combating Trafficking in Persons, requires any
contractor providing supplies acquired outside the United States (other than
commercially available off the shelf items) or services performed outside the United
States with an estimated value to exceed $500,000 to maintain a compliance plan that
includes “[p]rocedures to prevent agents and subcontractors at any tier and at any dollar
value from engaging in trafficking in persons . . . and to monitor, detect, and terminate any
agents, subcontracts, or subcontractor employees that have engaged in such activities.” FAR
52.222-50(h) (2016) (emphasis added). This means that for government contracts
meeting the $500,000 non-domestic supply requirement, the FAR necessitates a level of
control beyond that which insulated Wal-Mart from liability in Doe I and is inconsistent
with the disclaimers discussed in Part V. A business may have persuasive reasons for
not adopting the disclaimers in their entirety, such as being subject to the FAR. But the
business should do so aware of the potential risks involved in terms of assuming greater
control over the indirect supplier’s employees.
66. See generally Class Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 1:18-cv-10360
(D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2018), 2018 WL 1051865 [hereinafter Hershey Co. Class Action
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in the District of Columbia narrowly survived a motion to dismiss.67
The other consumer protection cases brought to date generally fall
into two categories: the chocolate cases68 and the fishermen cases.69
While the Model Contract Disclaimers will have less impact on
consumer protection actions, the cases illustrate how supply
agreements affect consumer perception and, more importantly, the
emerging litigation risk from consumer classes as consumers become
more aware, and more appalled, over how their products are
sourced. I begin with the case that probably signals the evolutionary
path of consumer-based deceptive advertising litigation in this area.
A. National Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In late 2015, the National Consumers League (NCL) filed suit
against Wal-Mart, J.C. Penney, and The Children’s Place (“Retailers”
or “Retail Defendants”) alleging the Retail Defendants’ corporate
social responsibility statements on their websites misled consumers
regarding the use of forced labor or child labor in the supply chain,
violating the District of Columbia’s Consumer Protection Procedures
Act (CPPA).70 The plaintiff alleged that the Retail Defendants’
websites discussed their efforts to impose a general code of conduct
on their suppliers regarding the production of goods.71 For example,
Complaint]; Class Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Mars, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10359 (D. Mass.
Feb. 26, 2018), 2018 WL 1051861 [hereinafter Mars, Inc. Class Action Complaint]; Class
Action Complaint, Tomasella v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-10269 (D. Mass. Feb. 12,
2018), 2018 WL 823151 [hereinafter Nestle USA, Inc. Class Action Complaint].
67. See Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL
4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016) (denying the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss).
68. See Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 891
F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954 (N.D. Cal.
2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F.
Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.).
69. See Wirth v. Mars, Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Sud v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016),
amended by 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 731 F. App’x 719 (9th Cir.
2018) (mem.); Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d,
730 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.).
70. See Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *1. The NCL “provides
government, businesses, and other organizations with the consumer’s perspective on
concerns including child labor, privacy, food safety, and medication information,” and its
mission is “to protect and promote social and economic justice for consumers and workers
in the United States and abroad.” Mission, NCL, http://www.nclnet.org/mission (last
visited June 1, 2019).
71. Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *1.
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Wal-Mart declared on its website “[t]he safety and well-being of
workers across our supply chain is the Responsible Sourcing group’s
top priority.”72 Wal-Mart also stated in its “Sourcing Standards &
Resources” and “Standards for Suppliers” that its suppliers are
contractually required to sign its Standards for Suppliers prior to
production, comply with all applicable laws and regulations, and
provide workers with a safe and healthy work environment.73 WalMart further stated that it conducts facility compliance audits
through a “multi-color auditing” system every six to twenty-four
months to monitor supplier compliance with its standards.74 The
plaintiff alleged J.C. Penney and The Children’s Place had similar
statements on their websites encouraging consumers to believe
forced labor was not present in their supply chains because they used
regularly implemented auditing procedures to detect and curb the
use of forced labor.75 The plaintiff relied on the Rana Plaza building
collapse as evidence that the Retail Defendants failed to comply with
their corporate statements and failed to follow their audit
procedures, both in violation of the CPPA.76
As in the cases discussed below, the defendants moved to dismiss,
arguing the corporate statements were aspirational and not actionable
because no reasonable consumer would construe those statements as
definitive promises of what the corporations will do.77 The court
agreed, for the most part, holding most of the statements relied on by
the NCL were aspirational in nature.78 Indeed, the court noted the
reason the Retail Defendants have an auditing process is to check on

72. Complaint at 2, Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015
CA 007731 B, (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2015), 2015 WL 11237102 [hereinafter Nat’l
Consumers League Complaint].
73. Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *3; see also Nat’l Consumers League
Complaint, supra note 72, at 3 (describing Wal-Mart’s purported auditing process to verify
compliance with the Standards for Suppliers). The court went beyond some of the
allegations in the plaintiff’s Complaint and examined the website of each defendant,
finding that examining the corporate statements located online was similar to examining
contracts attached to a complaint. Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *2 n.3.
74. Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL 4080541, at *3.
75. Id. at *2–4.
76. Id. at *5.
77. Id. at *7.
78. Id. at *10–11. The court found that the plain language of the statements
used qualifying language such as “expect,” “goal,” and “ask,” which demonstrated the
aspirational nature of the statements, falling short of a consumer promise. Id. at *11.
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whether suppliers are following their corporate statements, which
presumes the possibility that some suppliers will violate the standards.79
But the court denied the motion to dismiss as to the Retail
Defendants’ auditing statements. Under § 28-3904(e) of the CPPA, a
false statement is not required to create actionable conduct; a false
impression is sufficient.80 The court held the “in-depth descriptions
and detailed statistics of the auditing process can influence the
reasonable consumer’s purchasing decision. If in reality no audits
were done, then representations about the auditing process would be
misleading to consumers purchasing merchandise.”81 Further, the
statements describing the auditing process were specific and
verifiable, removing them from the realm of puffery.82 Thus, the
court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part as to the
detailed descriptions of the supplier-auditing process. The court
cautioned that summary judgment proceedings might reveal an
auditing process existed sufficient to conclude the internet
descriptions were not misleading.83 As of the date of this publication,
National Consumers League is the sole case based on my research that
has survived a motion to dismiss based on false-advertising claims. It
appears that the case may have resolved during discovery based on a
joint consent motion for judgment.84 The case is now closed.
B. The Chocolate Cases
Consumer plaintiffs filed at least six class actions alleging falseadvertising claims against domestic chocolate retailers for failing to
disclose forced labor in their supply chain.85 In early 2018, Danell

79. Id. at *13.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *15.
82. Id. at *16.
83. Id.
84. See Order Granting Consent Joint Motion for Judgment and Bar, Nat’l Consumers
League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B (D.C. Super. Ct. July 14, 2017); see
also Statement on Resolution of Lawsuit Against Walmart, JC Penney, and The Children’s Place, NCL,
https://www.nclnet.org/resolution_walmart (last visited June 1, 2019).
85. In 2018, three actions were brought in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts. See Hershey Co. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, at 1; Mars,
Inc. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, at 1; Nestle USA, Inc. Class Action
Complaint, supra note 66, at 1. Previously, three actions were brought in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California in 2016. See generally Dana v.
Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2016); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F.
Supp. 3d 954 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D.
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Tomasella filed three class action lawsuits in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts against The Hershey Company,
Nestlé USA, Inc., and Mars, Inc. alleging a violation of the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act and unjust enrichment from
failing to disclose the use of child and slave labor in their supply
chains to the consuming public.86 The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims on the grounds that they
have no duty to disclose forced labor in the supply chain, holding
that “it is not plausible that Nestlé’s failure to disclose information
about the labor practices in its supply chain at the point of sale could
have the ‘capacity to mislead consumers, acting reasonably under the
circumstances, to act differently from the way they otherwise would
have acted.’”87 As discussed below, this was also a successful
argument in defeating the chocolate and fisherman failure-to-disclose
class actions asserted under California law.88 Given the logical fallacy
in the court’s opinion (that failure to disclose information in labor
practices in the supply at point of sale could have the capacity to
mislead consumers), it is not surprising that the cases have been
appealed.89 The open question before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit will be whether, under Massachusetts’s Consumer
Protection Law, the failure to disclose the likely use of child or slave
labor “possesses a tendency to deceive” and “could reasonably be
found to have caused a person to act differently from the way he [or
she] otherwise would have acted.”90
Similarly, consumer-plaintiffs filed three California class actions
against Mars, Nestlé, and Hershey Co. in 2016.91 As discussed below,

Cal. 2016). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of each of the California
Chocolate cases. See generally McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 730 F. App’x. 462 (9th Cir.
2018) (mem.); Dana v. Hershey Co., 730 F. App’x. 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.);
Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018).
86. See Hershey Co. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, at 30–34; Mars, Inc.
Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, ¶¶ 76–92; Nestle USA, Inc. Class Action
Complaint, supra note 66, at 34–37.
87. Tomasella v. Nestle USA, Inc., Nos. 18-cv-10269-ADB, 18-cv-10359, 18-cv10360, 2019 WL 383884, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2019) (emphasis added).
88. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
89. See Tomasella v. Hershey Co., No. 19-1132 (1st Cir. Feb. 4, 2019).
90. Tomasella, 2019 WL 383884, at *5.
91. See Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 655 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F.
App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 957
(N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Hodsdon v. Mars,
Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018).
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those cases were dismissed because under California law there is no
duty, as of yet, to disclose forced labor in the supply chain.92
The factual background for all of the chocolate cases deserves
some attention here. The district court’s opinion in Hodsdon v. Mars,
Inc., granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss begins with this
acknowledgement: “That children and forced laborers pick cocoa
beans on a daily basis is indisputably an international tragedy.”93
According to the complaint, cocoa beans used to make the
defendants’ (here Mars, Inc.) chocolate come from the Ivory Coast,
where children and forced laborers “wield dangerous tools, transport
heavy loads, and face exposure to toxic substances.”94 Children often
arrive at these farms having been sold to, or kidnapped by, traffickers.
According to the complaint, “[t]he working conditions on the farms
are deplorable.”95 Workers often do not receive pay, sleep in locked
quarters, and fear physical abuse as punishment.96
The domestic chocolate industry is aware of these abuses and has
taken illusory measures to eradicate the worst forms of child labor on
the cocoa farms.97 According to the complaint, the defendants
acknowledge their failure to achieve a certification system to
eradicate the worst forms of child labor and have an aspirational goal
of achieving certified sourcing by 2020.98 Mars does not disclose this
information about its chocolate suppliers on the labels or
advertisements of most of its chocolate products, such as M&M’s,
Snickers, and Milky Way bars.99
The plaintiffs in the three California cases asserted class action
claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Consumers
Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and False Advertising Act (FAL) based on
the allegation that he or she would not have purchased, or paid as
much money for, the defendants’ chocolate products had the labels
included disclosures about the labor practices of the defendants’

92. See infra notes 100–26 and accompanying text.
93. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1019. Hodsdon is the seminal decision in the
chocolate cases, but similar claims have been asserted against the other major
chocolate retailers in the United States.
94. Id. at 1020.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Mars does make Dove chocolates, which state the cocoa is purchased from
Rainforest Alliance Certified farms. See id.
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suppliers.100 The cases were dismissed for failure to state a claim under
California’s consumer protection laws.101 The courts agreed the
plaintiffs had standing to pursue these claims even though the plaintiff
could not trace any of the purchased chocolate to a specific farm, and
the plaintiff did not allege he relied on the omitted information in
purchasing the product.102 The Hodsdon court held the plaintiff’s
allegation that he would not have purchased, or would have paid less
for the product, had he known that cocoa harvested by children and
forced laborers was in the supply chain was sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that he suffer an injury in fact.103
The mainstay of the court’s dismissal of the UCL, CLRA, and FAL
claims was the court’s holding that there is no duty to disclose
information about labor practices in the a supply chain.104 California
courts have generally rejected a broad obligation to disclose, except
for omissions needed to correct a representation made by the
defendant or when the non-disclosure posed a safety risk or
concerned a product defect.105 The duty to disclose does not extend
to situations where the information may persuade the customer to
make a different purchasing decision.106 Here, there was no
misrepresentation about forced labor in the defendants’ supply
chain; to the contrary, information regarding the potential childlabor practices is readily available on Mars’s website.107 And while
sourcing products derived from child labor may be deplorable, the
plaintiff did not allege it posed a safety risk to consumers or
constituted a product defect. Thus, there was no duty to disclose.
100. See Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 655–56 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d,
730 F. App’x 462 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d
954, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Hodsdon,
162 F. Supp. 3d at 1019.
101. See Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 670; McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 972; Hodsdon, 162
F. Supp. 3d at 1029.
102. See Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 660–61, 663; McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 962, 964;
Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
103. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022; accord Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 663 (“It is
plausible that a consumer would place less value on a product produced from a
supply chain involving severe labor abuses.”); McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 964 (“[I]f a
customer has paid a premium for an assurance that a product meets certain
standards, and the assurance turns out to be meaningless, the premium that the
customer has paid is an actual, personal, particularized injury . . . .”).
104. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1029.
105. Id. at 1025–26.
106. Id. at 1026.
107. Id. at 1027.
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The plaintiffs appealed.108 In Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc.,109 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ claims. The court held that manufacturers do not have a
duty, under California law, to disclose forced labor or child labor,
“even though they are reprehensible, because they are not physical
defects that affect the central function of the chocolate products.”110
The court, somewhat begrudgingly, acknowledged that California
state court precedent suggested that a duty to disclose is not limited
to (1) correcting a misrepresentation, or (2) a safety hazard.111
However, in analyzing those more expansive cases, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that in the absence of an affirmative misrepresentation,
there is a duty to disclose only when the defect goes to the central
function of the product.112 Even assuming that child labor in the
supply chain is material to consumers, the court held that the lack of
disclosure about child labor is “not a physical defect at all, much less
one related to the chocolate’s function as chocolate.”113 As the court
noted: “A computer chip that corrupts the hard drive, or a laptop
screen that goes dark, renders those products incapable of use by any
consumer; some consumers of chocolate are not concerned about
the labor practices used to manufacture the product.”114 Thus, the
manufacturers had no duty to disclose under the CLRA or the FAL.
California’s UCL prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business
acts or practices.115 The plaintiffs alleged unsuccessfully that the
defendant violated the unlawful business act prong of the UCL
through its violation of the CLRA, which, as discussed above, failed.116
They also argued the failure to disclose child labor in the supply of
cocoa beans violated the unfair business practice prong of the UCL.117

108. The chocolate cases and the fisherman cases discussed below were
consolidated for oral argument. See, e.g., Wirth v. Mars, Inc., 730 F. App’x 468, 468
n.1 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem).
109. 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018).
110. Id. at 860.
111. Id. at 863.
112. Id. The court noted that the duty might be even more limited, such that the
defect goes to the central function of the product and will arise during the warranty
period. Id. The court also acknowledged that there may be a separate duty to disclose
safety hazards that do not go to the product’s central function. Id. at 863 n.3.
113. Id. at 864.
114. Id.
115. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2018).
116. Hodsdon, 891 F.3d at 865.
117. Id. at 866.
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The court also rejected this argument.118 The Hodsdon court noted
that the precise contours of an “unfair” business practice under the
UCL are in flux, setting forth two definitions of an “unfair” business
practice. Something is “unfair” when it (1) “offends an established
public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers,”119 or (2) is
tethered to a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.120 The
court applied both tests.
Under the “tethering” test, the plaintiffs argued that the claims
were tied to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Labour Organization’s (ILO)
Convention 182 (“Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention”)—the
former forbidding slavery and the latter forbidding the worst forms of
child labor.121 But the court held that the labeling of products is “too
far removed from the UN and ILO policies to serve as the basis for a
UCL claim. As such, the UN Convention and the Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention do not provide a tether here.”122 Further, the court
hypothesized that requiring Mars to place labels on its products could
impinge on California’s Supply Chains Act, which requires that
companies disclose on their websites efforts to monitor for forced labor
in the supply chain but does not require product labels.123
The court also held Mars’s alleged failure to disclose its chocolate
likely contained products harvested by child labor and forced labor
was not immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious to consumers.124 The court remarked,
While the labor practices themselves are clearly immoral, it is
doubtful that failing to disclose on the label that a product may be
tainted by such labor practices is itself immoral, especially when
there is no specific duty to disclose this information and the
information is otherwise disclosed under the Supply Chains Act.125
118. Id. at 867.
119. Id. at 866 (quoting Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1169
(9th Cir. 2012)).
120. Id. (citing Davis, 691 F.3d at 1169–70).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 867.
123. Id. California’s Supply Chains Act requires retailers and manufacturers with
more than $100,000,000 in gross receipts to disclose their efforts to eradicate slavery
and human trafficking from their direct supply chain for tangible goods. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714.43 (West 2018).
124. Hodsdon, 891 F.3d at 867.
125. Id.
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Further, the failure to disclose was not substantially injurious
because, as mentioned above, information about slave and child
labor is public knowledge and accessible on Mars’ website—pursuant
to the Supply Chains Act.126
C. The Fishermen Cases
The fishermen cases alleged similar legal claims to those in the
chocolate cases.127 According to the complaints, small fishing boats
in waters between Thailand and Indonesia were reported by the U.S.
Department of Labor for implementing forced labor.128 These small
ships—“ghost ships”—deliver payloads of fish to “motherships”
operated by Thai Union Frozen Products PCL, the Thai partner to
the defendants in the fisherman cases.129 The Thai Union then uses
the fish either as feed (e.g., for prawn food), or delivers the fish to the
U.S. companies directly (e.g., for use in cat food or tuna fish).130 The
plaintiffs in these cases alleged dangerous and inhumane working
conditions on the small fishing vessels carrying payloads to the Thai
Union motherships, and that they would not have purchased the
defendants’ products if they knew of the labor abuses.131
In Sud v. Costco,132 the court dismissed for lack of standing without
needing to reach the false advertising claims.133 The plaintiffs alleged
prawns purchased from Costco were fed with fish sourced from Thai
suppliers committing labor abuses.134 The Sud court held the plaintiffs
had not rebutted evidence put forth by the defendant that the prawns

126. Id.
127. See Wirth v. Mars, Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.); Sud v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan
15, 2016), amended by 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 731 F. App’x 719
(9th Cir. 2018)(mem.); Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018)(mem.).
128. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *1; Sud, 2016 WL 192569, at *1; Barber, 154 F.
Supp. 3d at 956–57.
129. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *1; see also Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 957.
130. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *1; Sud, 2016 WL 192569, at *1; Barber, 154 F.
Supp. 3d at 956–57.
131. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *1; Sud, 2016 WL 192569, at *1, *3; Barber, 154
F. Supp. 3d at 957.
132. No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569 (N.D. Cal. Jan 15, 2016).
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id. at *1.
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purchased as the basis for the plaintiffs’ claim were not sourced in
Thailand.135 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.136
In Wirth v. Mars, Inc.,137 the court reached a similar holding on the
false advertising claims as the courts addressing the chocolate cases:
there is no duty to disclose information concerning the likelihood of
forced labor in the supply chain when defendants have not made a
false representation and the omission does not concern product
safety.138 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision based on Hodsdon.139
Finally, the plaintiffs in Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc.140 alleged Nestlé’s
online statements about its supply-chain principles were misleading.141
For example, Nestlé’s website had the statement, “Nestlé requires its
supplies [sic], agents, subcontractors and their employees to
demonstrate honesty, integrity and fairness, and to adhere to the
Nestlé Supplier Code of Conduct.”142 Nestlé responded by arguing
these statements are aspirational, and that it acknowledges not all
suppliers will immediately meet these requirements.143 The court held
no reasonable consumer who reads the documents in context could
conclude Nestlé’s suppliers comply with Nestlé’s requirements in all
circumstances; to the contrary, the guidelines suggest Nestlé anticipates a
certain level of noncompliance.144 Therefore, the court held the plaintiffs
failed to state a misrepresentation claim on the basis of these statements.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the basis of Hodsdon.145
The next set of cases involves claims asserted by the actual workers,
as opposed to consumer statements based on false advertising.

135. Id. The defense presented evidence the prawn feed at issue was sourced in
Vietnam or Indonesia. Id. The plaintiffs were alleging the labor abuses were within a
Thai supply line. Id.
136. 731 F. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2018).
137. No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016),
aff’d, 730 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.).
138. Id. at *5.
139. Wirth v. Mars, Inc., 730 F. App’x 468, 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.).
140. 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 730 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.).
141. Id. at 956.
142. Id. at 963 (alterations omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 964.
145. Barber v. Nestle USA, Inc., 730 F. App’x 464, 465 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.).
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IV. EMPLOYEE CASES: THE VIABILITY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
AND THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT
AGAINST DOMESTIC ENTITIES
More recent employee/plaintiff cases have asserted claims under
the ATS and the TVPRA. These cases involve employees of a supplier
in the downside supply chain suing a U.S. entity who allegedly
benefitted from the supplier’s use of forced labor. But jurisdiction
under the ATS is virtually closed to claimants seeking to recover for
foreign acts that occurred under foreign soil,146 or those seeking to
recover against foreign corporations.147 The TVPRA, in contrast, has
an expansive and explicit exterritorial jurisdictional grant.148
A. The Alien Tort Statute as a Basis for Liability Against Domestic Corporations
The ATS provides, “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”149
The Supreme Court has limited application of the ATS in several
ways, but for our purposes, the most significant limitation is that
imposed by the presumption against extraterritoriality.150 Doe I v.
Nestle USA, Inc.151 demonstrates the legal wrangling under the ATS.152
The Nestle plaintiffs filed suit in 2005 against domestic cocoa
purchasers alleging they aided and abetted child slavery by providing
assistance to farmers on the Ivory Coast in violation of the ATS.153

146. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (barring
claims asserted under the ATS when the violations occurred outside the United
States, due to the presumption against extraterritoriality).
147. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018) (“For these reasons,
judicial deference requires that any imposition of corporate liability on foreign
corporations for violations of international law must be determined in the first
instance by the political branches of the Government.”).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1596 (2012).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
150. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117.
151. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
152. Id. at 1027–28.
153. Id. at 1016. The court summarized the allegations:
The plaintiffs in this case are three victims of child slavery. They were forced
to work on Ivorian cocoa plantations for up to fourteen hours per day six
days a week, given only scraps of food to eat, and whipped and beaten by
overseers. They were locked in small rooms at night and not permitted to
leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be
beaten or tortured. Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet
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The plaintiffs alleged the defendants provided money, equipment, and
training to Ivorian farmers, knowing these provisions would facilitate
the use of forced child labor.154 The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that corporations could not
be sued under the ATS and that the plaintiffs failed to allege a claim
for aiding and abetting slave labor.155 The plaintiffs appealed.
Under Supreme Court precedent, federal courts are available to
hear tort claims based on violations of international law: “[F]ederal
common law creates tort liability for violations of international legal
norms, and the ATS in turn provides federal courts with jurisdiction
to hear these hybrid common law—international law tort claims.”156
The Ninth Circuit permitted this case to go forward against the
corporate defendants (as opposed to states), in holding “the
prohibition against slavery is universal” and does not only apply to
nation-states.157 But the defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ claim
sought an extraterritorial application of federal law barred by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.158 This is
potentially the strongest defense to ATS claims based on supply-side
forced labor. In Kiobel, the Court held prudential concerns about
judicial interference in foreign policy are particularly strong in ATS
litigation and concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality
thus constrains courts exercising their power under the ATS.159 But
here, the claims were asserted against domestic corporations.
Rather than attempt to elucidate the Supreme Court’s precedent
on the proper test for extraterritorial restraint under the ATS, the
of children who attempted to escape, and John Doe III knew that the guards
forced failed escapees to drink urine.
Id. at 1017. The plaintiffs also raised claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) and state law negligence and unjust enrichment claims. See Doe v. Nestle,
S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2010), rev’d, 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.
2014). The plaintiffs conceded the state law claims were foreclosed by Doe I v. WalMart Stores. Id. at 1120–21 (citing 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009)). The court dismissed
the TVPA claims because (1) the Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts from which
it could infer that the Defendants aided and abetted torture; (2) corporations could
not be held liable under the TVPRA (an issue that was in conflict in the courts); and
(3) the complaint failed to allege facts from which it could be reasonably inferred
that the Ivorian farmers acted under “color of law.” Id. at 1120.
154. Doe I v. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1017.
155. Id. at 1018.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1022.
158. 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Doe I v. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1027.
159. Kiobel, 596 U.S. at 116, 124.
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Ninth Circuit remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint in light of Kiobel.160 But the district court then
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, based on the two-step framework
for the extraterritorial analysis of claims imposed by the Supreme
Court in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community161:
Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extra
territoriality issues.
At the first step, we ask whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is,
whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it
applies extraterritorially. We must ask this question regardless of
whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or
merely confers jurisdiction. If the statute is not extraterritorial,
then at the second step we determine whether the case involves a
domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to
the statute’s “focus.” If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus
occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible
domestic application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if
the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country,
then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application
regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.162

Applying the “focus test” under the second step of the analysis, the
district court found that the conduct relevant to the focus of the
ATS—the child-slave labor in the chocolate industry—occurred in
the Ivory Coast.163 The court rejected the theory that corporate
supervision of those foreign acts was sufficient to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality.164
The plaintiffs appealed again to the Ninth Circuit. During the
pendency of the appeal, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court held, in
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,165 that the ATS does not impose liability on
foreign corporations for human rights violations.166 This decision

160. Doe I v. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1028–29. But see Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 95
F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1018 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (precluding human trafficking claim under
ATS based on extraterritorial action).
161. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
162. Nestle v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133-SVW-MRW, 2017 WL 6059134, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2017) (quoting RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2101), rev’d sub nom.,
Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018).
163. Id. at *8.
164. Id.
165. 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
166. Id. at 1408 (“For these reasons, judicial deference requires that any
imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations of
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forecloses ATS liability for forced labor abuses against foreign
corporations but not domestic entities that profit from forced labor in the
supply chain.167 The Nestle plaintiffs, in this case that was filed over
thirteen years ago, had alleged several foreign corporations as defendants
and discussed the domestic and foreign defendants as a single block.168
The Court’s decision in Jesner required that those claims be dismissed.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to allow the plaintiffs to
amend their pleadings to accommodate the change in the law.169
But the Ninth Circuit also addressed the district court’s decision
that the principal against extraterritorial application of the ATS
precluded the plaintiffs’ claims.170 The court agreed that RJR Nabisco
requires a two-step inquiry for ATS claims.171 Under the second step,
the court must look to the statute’s focus to determine whether the
case involves a domestic application of the statute.172 The court
disagreed with the defendants’ argument that the analysis should
focus on the location where the principal offense or the injury
occurred, rather than the location of where any aiding or abetting
took place.173 The court held that it must decide whether there is any
domestic conduct (such as aiding or abetting) relevant to the
statute’s focus that occurred in the United States, which would be a
permissible domestic application.174
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held the plaintiffs
had alleged domestic conduct sufficient to state a claim within the
ATS’s focus.175 The specific domestic conduct that the court found
sufficient was that the defendants allegedly provided “‘personal
spending money to maintain the farmers’ and/or the cooperatives’
international law must be determined in the first instance by the political branches of
the Government.”).
167. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2018).
168. See generally Complaint, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. 2:05-CV-05133 (C.D. Cal. July
14, 2005).
169. Doe v. Nestle, 906 F.3d at 1127.
170. Id. at 1126–27.
171. Id. at 1124–25.
172. Id. at 1125. The court first asked whether the ATS “gives a “clear, affirmative
indication that it applies extraterritorially.” Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2094 (2016)). In Kiobel, the Supreme Court answered that
question, holding that the “presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims
under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.” Id. (quoting
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1125–26.
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loyalty as an exclusive supplier.”176 The court inferred that the
spending money was outside the ordinary business contract and was
given with the purpose of maintaining ongoing relationships with the
farms “so the defendants could continue receiving cocoa at a price
that would not be obtainable without employing child slave labor.”177
Providing personal spending money to maintain a relationship was
more akin to “kickbacks” than ordinary business conduct, reasoned
the court.178 Additionally, the defendants “had employees from their
United States headquarters regularly inspect operations in the Ivory
Coast and report back to the United States offices, where these
financing decisions . . . originated.”179 In sum, “the allegations
paint[ed] a picture of overseas slave labor that defendants
perpetuated from headquarters in the United States.”180 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit is the sole federal court of appeals to permit an ATS
claim by foreign employees against domestic corporations to survive a
motion to dismiss based on an analysis that domestic funding is
sufficient to state a claim regarding domestic action. The case will be
remanded to district court (unless the defendants seek certiorari to
the U.S. Supreme Court) with leave for the plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint. This case will be closely watched by those
seeking to litigate claims based on forced labor in the supply chain.
Other courts have not interpreted the ATS as broadly as the Ninth
Circuit. In Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners,181 the families of thirteen Nepali
citizens alleged defendants Kellogg, Brown, & Root (“KBR”) and Daoud
& Partners engaged in a scheme to traffic the plaintiffs from Nepal to
Iraq, where one KBR subsidiary served as a contractor with the U.S.
government to perform specific duties at U.S. military facilities.182
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants “‘established, engaged
and/or contracted with a network of suppliers, agents, and/or
partners in order to procure laborers from third world countries.’”183
The deceased plaintiffs were recruited from Nepal, after being told
they would be working in a luxury hotel in Jordan or in an U.S.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
95 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
Id. at 1016.
Id.
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camp.184 None of the men were led to believe their work would be in
a dangerous area.185 They were promised a salary of $500 per
month.186 After they were recruited, the deceased plaintiffs were
transferred to a Jordanian job brokerage company where they first
learned they were being sent to work in Iraq.187 They also learned
they would be paid a fraction of what they were initially promised.188
Although they wanted to return home to Nepal, the men were
compelled to proceed to Iraq because of the debts their families had
assumed to pay the brokers.189 Daoud transported the victims to Iraq
via automobile caravan, where they were captured by an Iraqi
insurgent group.190 The insurgent group posted internet pictures of
the victims’ capture, and those images were broadcast on Nepali
television.191 The deceased plaintiffs described being “captives in
Jordan” and not knowing when they would die.192 The insurgent
group executed the men while videotaping the executions.193 Their
families saw the videos.194 Their bodies were never found.195
The plaintiffs, families of the victims, asserted Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), TVPRA, ATS,
and negligence claims against the defendants.196 The court dismissed
the negligence claims as barred by the statute of limitations.197 The
court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on the
RICO and ATS claims based on the presumption against
extraterritoriality, and in favor of defendant Daoud on the TVPRA
claim because it was never present in the United States, meaning it is
not within the TVPRA’s extraterritoriality jurisdiction provision.198
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1016–17.
191. Id. at 1017.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *1–3
(S.D. Tex. 2013).
197. Id. at *3.
198. Id. at *7–9; see also Adhikari, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 1022 (denying rehearing on ATS and
TVPRA claims against KBR and reaffirming finding of preclusion based on
extraterritoriality principles). The TVPRA portion of the case is discussed infra Section IV.B.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ATS
The court held the principle against
and TVPRA claims.199
extraterritoriality precluded the ATS claims, and affirmed the district
court’s denial of leave to amend the pleadings to allege domesticbased conduct.200 The court held that, for the deceased plaintiffs,
the recruitment, transportation, and alleged detention . . . all
occurred in Nepal, Jordan, and Iraq . . . . Thus, none of this
overseas conduct relevant to their trafficking claim—even
assuming . . . it can be imputed to KBR—could support the
conclusion that Plaintiffs seek to apply the ATS domestically.201

The plaintiffs argued that the U.S. based conduct rebutting the
presumption against extraterritoriality included the following: KBR’s
payment to Daoud, the contractor who hired the deceased plaintiffs
and Plaintiff Gurung; and Houston-based employees’ awareness of
allegations of human trafficking at KBR’s worksites.202 In an
application that differs starkly from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Doe, the Fifth Circuit held that the ATS’s focus is the violation of
international law—here all the conduct comprising the international
law violations happened in a foreign country.203 The plaintiffs did
not connect the financial payments to the human trafficking or
demonstrate that the U.S. based employees actually engaged in the
trafficking.204 The court found the allegation that U.S. employees
may have known of allegations of human rights abuse insufficient to
raise an issue of genuine fact that the employees were directly liable
for violating international law.205 Thus, Adhikari creates a schism with
Doe for a case in which financial benefit domestically was not
sufficient to provide the predicate domestic act to overcome the
presumption against extraterritorial application for ATS claims.
Judge Graves dissented from the majority’s decision on the ATS
claims, opining that the majority misinterpreted the applicable

199. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190 (5th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 134 (2017).
200. Id. at 199–200.
201. Id. at 195. The court also decided that KBR’s conduct on Al Asad, a military
base, did not constitute domestic conduct relevant to the ATS claims. Id. at 197.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 198.
205. Id.
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relevant conduct under the “focus” test.206 Judge Graves aptly noted
the defendant was a U.S. corporation, which should have some
pertinence in determining whether domestic conduct is at issue.207 In
the words of Judge Graves:
Given the proliferation of international agreements condemning
human trafficking and forced labor, surely these foreign policy
concerns are no less pertinent in the present day. Among several
international accords concerning trafficking, the United States has
signed and ratified a treaty that asks signatories to hold their citizens
responsible for transnational trafficking. Human trafficking has
been condemned as a modern-day form of slavery. The slave trader,
like the pirate, is “hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”
And just as a nation that harbored pirates provoked the concern of
other nations in past centuries, so harboring ‘common enemies of
all mankind’ provokes similar concerns today.
These foreign policy concerns are particularly heightened where, as
here, the defendant’s conduct directly implicates the United States and
its military. KBR was one of the largest U.S. military contractors
operating in Iraq. While KBR was allegedly exploiting trafficked labor at
Al Asad, the U.S. government and military were engaged in an
aggressive anti-trafficking campaign. “Contractors provide crucial
support for the U.S. military and are perceived internationally as an
extension of the military.” Congress repeatedly expressed concern that
failure to hold U.S. military contractors accountable for human
trafficking overseas undermines U.S. foreign policy.
This case substantially implicates the interests of the United States,
both domestically and abroad. While these considerable connections
to the United States may not be dispositive to the extraterritoriality
inquiry, they are of critical importance to analyzing the focus of the
ATS. At a minimum, they counsel a hard look at any domestic
conduct alleged on the part of the defendant. It simply contravenes
the focus of the ATS to disregard these facts entirely.208

Judge Graves essentially makes the argument that a domestic
company can engage in conduct abroad that should give rise to
extraterritorial application of the ATS. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari on October 2, 2017.209

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210–11.
Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 138 S. Ct. 134 (2017).
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Similarly, in Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co.,210 the plaintiffs,
Cambodian seafood factory workers, asserted TVPRA and ATS claims
against Thai seafood suppliers Phatthana Seafood Co. and S.S.
Frozen Food Co.; United States seafood distributor Rubicon
Resources LLC, which allegedly distributed seafood as part of a single
enterprise for Phatthana; and Wales & Co. Universe Ltd., a Thai
company registered to do business in California.211 The plaintiffs
alleged they were deceived into forced labor and unsanitary working
conditions through fraudulent promises of good jobs and forced into
servitude when Thai factory managers confiscated their passports.212
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the TVPRA’s
extraterritorial jurisdiction does not extend to these defendants and
is limited to criminal prosecutions.213 The defendants also argued the
court lacked jurisdiction over the ATS claims, and that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim under the TVPRA or ATS.214
The district court denied the motion to dismiss regarding the
TVPRA claims and, not surprisingly, granted it as to the ATS
claims.215 The court held the presumption against extraterritoriality
limited the reach of ATS jurisdiction, following Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.216 Despite an alleged degree of corporate presence for
the two domestic defendants, all of the alleged activities forming the
basis of the ATS claims occurred in Cambodia and Thailand.217 Thus,
the court held it did not have jurisdiction under the ATS.218 The
court explained,
210. No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASX), 2017 WL 8292922 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017).
211. Id. at *1–2.
212. Complaint at 1, Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. 2:16-cv-04271 (C.D. Cal.
June 15, 2016). The workers allege they were paid less than promised and had fees
deducted for housing, fees and other charges. Id. They also allege they worked long
hours and were packed into unsanitary and crowded housing. When the villagers tried
to return home, they could not get their passports back. Some workers could not make
enough money after working six days a week to afford food and were forced to eat
seafood that had washed up on the beach. Those who returned home faced more
extreme poverty for losing the land they had put up as collateral. Id. at 1–2.
213. Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2016 WL
11020222, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016).
214. Id. at *4.
215. Id. at *8. For a discussion on the resolution of the TVPRA claims, see infra
Section IV.A.
216. See Ratha, 2016 WL 11020222, at *7–8 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)).
217. Id. at *6.
218. Id. at *8.
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In this case, the alleged tort is human trafficking which occurred in
Cambodia and Thailand. Even assuming that all of the Defendants
have some corporate presence in the United States (either directly
or through the joint venture and agency relationship between the
Defendants), the activities at issue in this action—allegedly
recruiting and then entrapping third country nationals as cheap
labor for Thai seafood factories—unquestionably occurred on
foreign soil. This is the type of case—where all the allegedly
tortious conduct took place on foreign soil and the only
connection to the United States is a defendant’s “mere corporate
presence”—which the Supreme Court held in Kiobel is insufficient
to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.219

In contrast to the ATS claims, the plaintiffs have generally fared better
in overcoming jurisdictional obstacles by stating claims under the TVPRA.
B. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act Claims
More recently, employee-victims are asserting foreign forced labor
claims under the TVPRA in conjunction with Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) claims. The TVPRA is a criminal statute that also carries a
private right of action for a civil remedy. The TVPRA, in contrast to
the ATS, has a known purpose coupled with a broad jurisdictional
grant. The TVPRA’s objectives are to combat the growing issue of
human trafficking in the commercial sex industry, modern slavery,
and forced labor.220 The TVPRA provides criminal penalties for:
Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value,
from participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection
(a) [enumerating acts of forced labor], knowing or in reckless disregard
of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or obtaining of
labor or services by any of such means . . . .221

The TVPRA criminalizes other conduct, such as child sex
trafficking,222 trafficking or engaging in forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or peonage,223 and possession or destruction of
passports or government documents in furtherance of those acts.224
The key provision that would concern most domestic companies that
219. Id.
220. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012) (outlining the purpose of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b).
222. § 1591.
223. § 1590.
224. § 1592(a).
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have known forced labor or child labor in the supply chain should be
§ 1589. That section, set forth above, makes it a criminal act to
knowingly benefit financially from participation in a venture engaged
in forced labor, if that participation was in knowing or reckless
disregard of the fact that the venture had engaged in the unlawful
act.225 The TVPRA provides victims of these criminal acts a civil
remedy against a perpetrator or “whoever knowingly benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a
venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged
in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].”226
In 2008, Congress amended the TVPRA to give it an extraterritorial
application. Section 1596, titled “Additional jurisdiction in certain
trafficking offenses,” states:
(a) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial
jurisdiction otherwise provided by law, the courts of the United
States have extra-territorial jurisdiction over any offense (or any
attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense) under section 1581,
1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591 if—
(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as those terms
are defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1101)); or
(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective
of the nationality of the alleged offender.227

One of the enumerated predicates for jurisdiction under § 1596 is
§ 1589, which, set forth above, makes actionable mere benefit,
instead of active procurement of forced labor or child labor.228
This express grant of extraterritorial application means that, at
least facially, the TVPRA should not face the same extraterritorial
obstacles in holding domestic entities liable for profiting from
reckless disregard of forced labor practices in a foreign country as did
the ATS. So far, courts have permitted a TVPRA claim based on
allegations of foreign forced labor to move forward whereas the ATS
claim could not.229
225. § 1589(b).
226. § 1595(a).
227. § 1596.
228. § 1589(b).
229. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 204 (5th Cir.
2017) (“Prior to § 1596, a private party could not maintain a civil cause of action under
the TVPRA for forced labor or human trafficking that occurred overseas. . . . After
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Take, for example, Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co.230 Although the
district court dismissed the ATS claims based on the presumption
against extraterritorial reach, it denied the motion to dismiss the
TVPRA claims.231
The defendants argued (1) the TVPRA’s
extraterritorial jurisdictional grant is limited to criminal actions; (2)
the jurisdictional grant applies only to individuals, not corporations;232
and (3) the presumption against extraterritoriality deprived the court
of subject-matter jurisdiction because all the alleged violations
occurred off domestic soil (Cambodia and Thailand).233
The district court rejected each argument as to the TVPRA claims.
The court noted that Congress added the jurisdictional expansion to
the 2008 reauthorization only after two courts considering TVPRA
suits had held the provisions were not intended to be extraterritorial.
According to the court, “Congress has clearly indicated that it intends
the TVPRA . . . to be a unified statutory scheme of interlocking
provisions that provides extraterritorial jurisdiction over specific
predicate offenses and further expressly provides for restitution and a
civil remedy whenever a court in the United States has that
jurisdiction.”234
In rejecting the defendants’ argument that the
extraterritorial grant applies only to criminal conduct, the court noted
that argument has been “overwhelmingly rejected by the courts.”235
§ 1596’s enactment, a TVPRA defendant in a civil suit could no longer rely on a
previously available defense: the presumption against extraterritoriality.”), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 134 (2017). The Fifth Circuit held that the Adhikari plaintiffs could not state
a claim under the TVPRA because the events occurred prior to the 2008 extraterritorial
grant added to the TVPRA and because it did not have retroactive effect. Id. at 204–06.
230. See supra notes 210–20 and accompanying text (providing the facts of Ratha).
231. Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2016 WL
11020222, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016).
232. In Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, the Supreme Court held that the term
“individual,” as used in the Torture Victim Protection Act (not to be confused with
the Trafficking Victim Protection Act), only imposed liability on natural persons and
not on corporations. 556 U.S. 449, 451–52 (2012). The district court in Doe v. Nestle,
S.A. dismissed the TVPA claims, in part, on this basis. 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1116
(C.D. Cal. 2010), rev’d, 776 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2013).
233. See Ratha, 2016 WL 11020222, at *5, *6 (addressing the defendants’ three arguments).
234. Id. at *5.
235. Id. at *6 (citing Aguilera v. Aegis Commc’ns Grp., 72 F. Supp. 3d 975, 979
(W.D. Mo. 2014); Doe v. Howard, No. 1:11-cv-1105, 2012 WL 383487, at *2 (E.D. Va.
Sept 4, 2012) (“entering default judgment for the plaintiff and allowing remedy
pursuant to Section 1595 for trafficking in Yemen and Japan”); Adhikari v. Daoud &
Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (applying civil remedies)). Doe
v. Howard, No. 1:11-cv-1105, 2012 WL 383487, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept 4, 2012); Adhikari
v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2009)).
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The defendants’ stronger argument was that the TVPRA’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction grant applies only to individuals. The court recognized
§ 1596(a)(1) is limited to individuals because it incorporates definitions of a
U.S. national and an alien lawfully admitted.236 But the court held
§ 1596(a)(2)’s use of the term “offender” (present in the United States)
applied to individuals and corporations.237 The court reasoned the use of
the term “person” in the remainder of § 1596 confirms that corporations
are covered by the statute.238 Note, the emphasis on “present” in the United
States could prove problematic for enforcement against non-domestic
entities, as could the Supreme Court’s recent activity limiting the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over foreign companies.239
Finally, the district court rejected the argument that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction because all the events occurred in other
countries. Section 1596 requires only that an offender be “present”
in the United States.240 This applies to the Delaware corporation and
was not disputed as to a defendant holding a California office.
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued these two entities benefitted
financially from the forced labor in the United States; thus, the court
held that extraterritorial jurisdiction was not implicated.241
However, the defendants argued that each defendant must be present
in the United States for the court to have subject-matter jurisdiction, and

236. Id.
237. Id. at *6–7.
238. Id. at *7.
239. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (holding the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation from conduct that occurred abroad unless
“the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant
and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State’” (quoting
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)));
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (limiting
state exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations when the accident
occurred overseas despite multiple contacts with the forum state); see also Gwynne L.
Skinner, Expanding General Personal Jurisdiction over Transnational Corporations for
Federal Causes of Action, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 617, 656 (2017) (“If a victim, including
one who is trafficked in the United States, brings suit against a foreign corporation
under the TVPA [Trafficking Victims Protection Act], including against a
[transnational corporation] doing significant business in the United States, the
victim may well be out of luck even though Congress intended such victims to be able
to obtain a remedy.”). The jurisdictional problems that TVPRA claims are likely to
face are the subject of a second work-in-progress by this author.
240. Ratha, 2016 WL 11020222, at *6.
241. Id.
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because two defendants, Phatthana and S.S. Frozen Foods, were not
present in the United States, subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist.242
The court held that even if all defendants must be present in the United
States for subject-matter jurisdiction to exist, the non-domestic entities
were present, based on the allegations in the complaint, through their
joint enterprise with the domestic defendants and because the domestic
defendants were agents of the foreign defendants.243
Ratha is significant to domestic entities because, unlike most ATS
claims based on forced labor in the supply chain, the victim-employee’s
TVPRA civil claims survived the motions to dismiss. But on December
21, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.244 The case is presently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.245
In granting judgment in favor of the defendants with a domestic
presence, Rubicon and Wales, the court took an imposingly narrow
view of the civil remedy provision, rejecting the argument that receipt
of financial benefit is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the
beneficiary “participat[e] in a venture.”246
According to the court, the undisputed facts demonstrated that:
Rubicon and Wales never had a business relationship with SSF.
Although Rubicon had a business relationship with Phatthana, it was
limited to ordering seafood products from Phatthana’s Songkhla
factory. Wales’s involvement was limited to inspecting finished product
ordered by Rubicon to ensure that product met Rubicon’s customers’
packaging specifications. With respect to working conditions and
worker safety at all of the factories that Rubicon used as a source for its
products, Rubicon relied on industry and government audits and
certifications as well as customer visits, to ensure that the factories,
including Phatthana’s Songkhla factory, operated in compliance with
all applicable standards, including those pertaining to worker safety
and welfare as well as compliance with labor laws. Wales relied on
Rubicon to ensure that those factories did not exploit workers.247

242. Id. at *7.
243. Id.
244. Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2017 WL
8293174, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017).
245. See Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. 18-55041 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2018).
246. Ratha, 2017 WL 8293174, at *3. To reiterate, Section 1595(a) provides,
“whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged
in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].” Id. This piece of the court’s decision is hotly
contested on appeal. See infra notes 258–68 and accompanying text.
247. Id. at *2.

2019]

MITIGATING RISK, ERADICATING SLAVERY

1743

The court rejected the argument that the TVPRA criminalizes, and
thus provides a civil remedy for, merely “passive” beneficiaries.
Instead, the court was seeking some evidence that the domestic
entities “‘took some action to operate or manage the venture,’ such
as directing or participating in Phatthana’s labor recruitment,
Phatthana’s employment practices, or the working conditions at
Phatthana’s Songkhla factory.”248 Finding no facts demonstrative of
this level of involvement, the court held the defendants did not
knowingly participate in human trafficking.249
The court also held that there was no evidence that the domestic
defendants benefitted from the supplier’s human trafficking. It was
“undisputed that [defendant] Rubicon never sold any product processed at
Phatthana’s Songkhla factory during the time that any of the [p]laintiffs
were employed there.”250 The plaintiffs argued that Rubicon benefitted
from the human trafficking because the factory at issue was a “primary
source of supply”; but the court found that the defendant had been selling
seafood long before the alleged abuses and “during the relevant time
period was selling approximately thirty-five million pounds of seafood per
year.” Accordingly, the court held that “the fourteen containers of seafood
purchased and ultimately returned during the same time period hardly
qualifies as a ‘primary source of supply.’”251
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that Rubicon and Wales knew or
should have known that the supplier engaged in forced labor based
on general reports about human trafficking in Thailand and reports
and letters by human rights advocacy groups specifically criticizing
the working conditions at the supplier factory.252 But the court held
that “Rubicon’s and Wales’s knowledge of forced labor—at a factory
that they did not own, operate, or have any control over—cannot be
based solely on conflicting and sometime unsubstantiated general
reports.”253 The court found no evidence that the defendants
directed or participated in the offending supplier’s labor recruitment
or employment practices, or that they were involved in establishing

248. Id. at *4 (quoting Bistline v. Jeffs, No. 2:16-CV-788 TS, 2017 WL 108039, at
*11 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2017), overruled in pertinent part sub nom., Bistline v. Parker, 918
F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2019)).
249. Id. at *5.
250. Id. at *6.
251. Id.
252. Id. at *5.
253. Id.
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the working conditions at the factory.254 Instead, defendant Rubicon
relied on “industry and government audits and certifications” to
ensure the factory met industry standards relating to worker safety
and welfare.255 Rubicon also returned the product after allegations of
worker exploitation were made public.256 Additionally, the court
noted that Rubicon and Wales “actively sought to source product
from companies that did not exploit their workers.”257
As with the employee-based negligence cases, the court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants highlights that
less control results in less of a legal duty to workers, which seems to
directly contradict the purpose of the TVPRA.258 The district court’s
narrow interpretation of “participation in a venture” (the key phrase
which gives rise to the civil remedy provision) is hotly contested on
appeal. There are significant reasons it should be overturned. First,
the case on which the district court relied in requiring “more than
receipt of a passive benefit,”259 Bistline v. Jeffs,260 was subsequently
overturned on appeal.261 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit rejected the district’s court’s interpretation requiring “more than
associating with or assisting an enterprise.”262 Instead, the Tenth Circuit
held that “complaisance” in response to exhibitions of TVPRA violations
is sufficient to meet the “participate in a venture” requirement.263
Another reason the district court’s heightened activity
requirement for “participate in a venture” is likely to be overturned
by the Ninth Circuit is because the First Circuit has held that
complaisance in response to several exhibitions of TVPRA violations
is sufficient to satisfy the “participate in a venture” element. In
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See Appellants’ Opening Brief at 2627, Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No.
18-55041 (9th Cir. May 25, 2018) (discussing congressional intent behind the 2008
revisions to the TVPRA).
259. Ratha, 2017 WL 8293174, at *4 (quoting Bistline v. Jeffs, No. 2:16-CV-788 TS,
2017 WL 108039, at *11 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2017), overruled in pertinent part sub nom.,
Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2019)).
260. No. 2:16-CV-788 TS, 2017 WL 108039 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2017), overruled in
pertinent part sub nom., Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2019).
261. See Parker, 918 F.3d at 873–76.
262. Jeffs, 2017 WL 108039, at *10; see also Parker, 918 F.3d at 873–76.
263. Parker, 918 F.3d at 873–76. The Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Ricchio v.
McLean, 855 F.3d 553, 557 (1st Cir. 2017), in interpreting “complaisance in response”
to exhibitions of predicate violations as the requisite test for participation in a venture.
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Ricchio v. McLean,264 retired Supreme Court Justice Souter, sitting by
designation, held that a hotel owner’s exchange of high-fives and
speaking of “getting this thing going again” with a male customer
who repeatedly and visibly raped, starved and drugged the victim
demonstrated “complaisance” in response to the violent and illegal
acts. This, according to the First Circuit, was sufficient to allege
“participation in a venture” under § 1595(a).265 The defendants
allegedly “benefitted” from this participation by receipt of the hotel
payments.266 Thus, leading precedent establishes, for now, that the
Ratha district court’s requirement of active conduct in the abusive
labor practices or recruitment may have been unduly stringent.
Another looming issue for those who would rely on the TVPRA’s
extraterritorial grant to police domestic entities’ financial benefit
from reckless disregard of forced labor in the supply chain is the
Supreme Court’s nuanced limits on extraterritorial application of
domestic statutes to foreign activity, even, whereas here, the
Congressional intent to reach that activity is clear. For example, in
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community—a case arising out of
allegations that RJR Nabisco violated RICO by participating in a
global money-laundering scheme with various organized crime
groups—the Court held that even though some of the RICO
predicate offenses at issue in the case rebutted the presumption
against extraterritorial application, the private right of action did
not.267 The Court noted, “providing a private civil remedy for foreign
conduct creates a potential for international friction beyond that
presented by merely applying U.S. substantive law to that foreign
conduct.”268 It is possible that following Nabisco, challenges to the
TVPRA’s civil remedy provision could be construed to not have
extraterritorial application because the extraterritorial jurisdictional
grant, § 1596, does not specifically reference the civil remedy
provision, § 1595. That would be a tortured interpretation of the
2008 amendments to the TVPRA as a whole, and to the specific
extraterritorial grant outlined in § 1596.

264. 855 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017).
265. Id. at 557 (Souter, J., sitting by designation).
266. Id. (“It is likewise inferable that the Patels understood that in receiving
money as rent for the quarters where McLean was mistreating Ricchio, they were
associating with him in an effort to force Ricchio to serve their business objective.”).
267. 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016).
268. Id.
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V. HOW ADOPTING THE MODEL CONTRACT CLAUSES TO IMPLEMENT
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS IN SUPPLY CONTRACTS CAN REDUCE THE
THREAT OF LITIGATION
One thing the foregoing discussion of domestic litigation involving
allegations in the supply chain demonstrates is that litigation efforts,
whether consumer or employee, are gaining momentum. Consumer
cases are developing through consumer protection statutes and an
evolving understanding of what, if anything, about a product’s
development is a material fact that must be disclosed.269 And employeebased claims are continuing to develop under both the TVPRA, with its
broad jurisdictional grant,270 and the ATS.271 One employee-based ATS
claim still ongoing in California has been in litigation since 2005, which
is a long time to be facing protracted litigation.272 But these lawsuits do
more than seek money damages; they result in headlines and increased
consumer awareness, which later becomes publicized in the
marketplace. Studies have shown that the number of consumers who
are willing to pay more for sustainable brands is on the rise.273 That is
where the MCCs to implement human rights protections in supply
contracts come in. In 2018, Professor David Snyder and Susan Maslow
published the proposed MCCs developed by the Working Group.274
The language and intent of those MCCs are set forth in that work.
The cases discussed in this Article, however, laid the foundation for a
specific part of those MCCs: the disclaimers. The Working Group
269. See supra Part III (discussing Nat’l Consumers League, the chocolate cases, and
the fishermen cases).
270. See, e.g., Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2016
WL 11020222, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016).
271. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2018).
272. Id.; see also Complaint, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. 2:05-CV-05133 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2005).
273. See, e.g., CONSUMER REPORTS® NAT’L RESEARCH CTR., FOOD LABELS SURVEY 2
(2016), http://greenerchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016_CRFoodLa
belsSurvey.pdf (“Most consumers (79%) are willing to pay more per pound for fruits
and vegetables produced by workers who earned a living wage and were treated
fairly.”); NIELSEN, THE SUSTAINABILITY IMPERATIVE: NEW INSIGHTS ON CONSUMER
EXPECTATIONS 2 (2015), https://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/nielsenglobal/dk/
docs/global-sustainability-report-oct-2015.pdf (last visited June 1, 2019) (“Sixty-six
percent of consumers say they are willing to pay more for sustainable brands—up
from 55% in 2014 and 50% in 2013.”); 2017 Cone Communications CSR Study, CONE
http://www.conecomm.com/research-blog/2017-csr-study (last visited June 1, 2019)
(finding that “87% [of consumers] will purchase a product because a company
advocated for an issue they cared about and 76% will refuse to purchase a company’s
products or services upon learning it supported an issue contrary to their beliefs”).
274. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1093–94.
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sought to research case law both to determine how powerful the threat
of litigation might be against domestic entities (it turns out it is
significant), but also, to determine if the cases suggested any theories of
liability that should be considered in the contract clause drafting. The
goal of the Working Group, in part, was to encourage domestic
corporate buyers to adopt the proposed contractual language. In that
spirit, the Working Group was careful, at this stage, to use language that
would disclaim purchaser control over supplier operations or
responsibility for worker safety, otherwise the question of a duty on
behalf of a domestic retailer may be fairly in question. This was the
theory the courts rejected, based in part on the contractual language, in
the employee-negligence cases.275 Monitoring, inspecting, and requiring
a supplier to comply should be a purchaser right, not a duty, consistent
with the cases finding no contractual liability on behalf of a domestic
purchaser, such as Rahaman v. J.C. Penney and Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores.276
Of course, what a retailer chooses to publish about these contractual
rights to the public, as in National Consumers League, is a decision for
corporate entities and not dictated by this Working Group.
The disclaimers proposed by the Working Group are:
5.7 Disclaimer Clauses. Notwithstanding anything contained herein:
a. Buyer does not assume a duty to monitor Supplier or its
Representatives, including, without limitation, for compliance with
laws or standards regarding working conditions, pay, hours,
discrimination, forced labor, child labor, or the like;
b. Buyer does not assume a duty to monitor or inspect the safety of
any workplace of Supplier or its Representatives nor to monitor any
labor practices of Supplier or its Representatives;
c. Buyer does not have the authority and disclaims any obligation to
control (i) the manner and method of work done by Supplier or its
Representatives, (ii) implementation of safety measures by Supplier or
its Representatives, or (iii) employment or engagement of employees
and contractors or subcontractors by Supplier or its Representatives;
d. There are no third-party beneficiaries to this Agreement; and

275. See supra Part II.
276. See Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174 MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375,
at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016); Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 685
(9th Cir. 2009); see also supra Part II (discussing the rejection of both state-law
negligence and unjust enrichment claims against employees based on lack of
contractual control over the workplace).
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e. Buyer assumes no duty to disclose the results of any audit,
questionnaire, or information gained pursuant to this Agreement
other than as required by applicable law.277

The disclaimers were drafted with the allegations of duty in Rahaman
and Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in mind, again with an eye towards
protecting those business entities who would venture to adopt the
MCCs from any interpretation that the agreement enhances control
over their foreign suppliers or that might be used as a basis for a
contractual duty to monitor foreign suppliers. Therefore, the MCCs
specifically disclaim a duty to monitor the Supplier for compliance
with the law or standards for working conditions, forced labor, or child
labor, although the contract may give the Supplier the right to do so.278
The disclaimers also disclaim a duty to monitor or inspect the safety of
a Supplier workplace, and the Supplier labor practices.279
Likewise, the clauses disclaim any obligation to control the manner
and method of the Supplier’s work, implementation of safety measures
or employment, and any duty to disclose the results of any information
gained pursuant to certain rights of the Buyer under these MCCs.280
Finally, the disclaimers explicitly reject the idea that the employees of a
Contracting Supplier are third-party beneficiaries of the representations
and warranties made in the MCCs.281 Additionally, it appears that the
level of control over the downside supplier may also be of factual
importance in TVPRA civil liability claims.282
Some critics will argue that the disclaimers go too far to insulate
U.S. corporations from knowingly engaging in supply-agreements
that involved forced labor or child labor in the supply chain.283 That
277. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1105 (footnotes omitted). The
Working Group noted that some of these proposed disclaimers conflict with the
requirements of the FAR. See id. at 1105 n.46–47. Additionally, the Working Group
commented that 5.7(c) may conflict with other proposed MCCs and cautioned
counsel to consider which clause would be more important to include in the contract.
See id. at 1105 n.48. Finally, the Working Group reflected that 5.7(e) “emphasizes that
Buyer is assuming no contractual duties to disclose although Buyer may have duties to
disclose under other standards (legal or non-legal).” Id. at 1105 n.49.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. See Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., No. CV 16-4271-JFW (ASx), 2017 WL
8293174, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) (entering judgment in favor of
defendants when there was no evidence of knowing participation or control over the
entity allegedly engaged in the forced labor abuses).
283. See, e.g., Sarah Dadush, supra note 6, at 1521.
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argument has some merit in that the goal in drafting the disclaimers,
at least from my perspective, was to incentivize domestic entities to
adopt the MCCs and not to increase exposure to domestic liability.
Nonetheless, the MCCs can only go so far in reducing the likelihood
that a contractual duty to downside Supplier employees would arise
out of increased monitoring or rights to terminate bad actors. The
TVPRA, with its extraterritorial reach, still looms large as a check on
domestic entities who knowingly benefit from engaging in a venture
using forced labor, as does the ATS and consumer class-action
fraudulent disclosure claims. The disclaimers cannot and should not
insulate a company who knowingly benefits from TVPRA predicate acts
from civil liability. To the contrary, in Ratha’s summary judgment grant,
the court looked instead to the efforts the defendant was taking to
inspect and monitor for forced labor in holding that it had not engaged
in a venture. In light of the traction these claims are gaining, both in
courts and in the media, domestic entities would be well-advised to do
more to detect and prevent forced labor in the supply chain even while
contractually disclaiming a duty to remote supplier employees.
Moreover, there may be reasons why a business would not want to
adopt all or any of the Model Contract Disclaimers proposed by the
Working Group. One significant reason is that for entities who are
governmental contractors, the disclaimers would likely run afoul of
the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (“FAR”) for many contracts.284
FAR 52.222-50(h), Combating Trafficking in Persons, requires any
contractor providing supplies acquired outside the United States
(other than commercially available off the shelf items) or services
performed outside the United States with an estimated value to exceed
$500,000 to maintain a compliance plan that includes “[p]rocedures to
prevent agents and subcontractors at any tier and at any dollar value from
engaging in trafficking in persons . . . and to monitor, detect, and terminate
any agents, subcontracts, or subcontractor employees that have engaged in such
activities.”285 This means that for government contracts meeting the
$500,000 non-domestic supply requirement, the FAR necessitates a level
of control inconsistent with the disclaimers discussed in this Part. This
conflict is indicated in the footnotes to the proposed disclaimers.286
Moreover, a business may determine that, based on its consumer
base and business needs, it seeks more control over its suppliers.
284. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1105 nn.46–47.
285. FAR 52.222-50(h)(3)(v) (2016) (emphasis added).
286. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 10, at 1105 nn.46–47.
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Then, the disclaimers may not serve its business purpose. For instance,
a business may want to retain the right to terminate employees of
Suppliers who engage in abusive labor practices consistent with Model
Clause 5.3(c). If so, that company might not want to include Model
Contract Disclaimer 5.7(c). Any business, of course, would need to work
with its own lawyer to consider its business needs, its own inspection and
monitoring practices, the likelihood of forced labor or child labor in its
supply chain and the risk of litigation. This may involve adopting some
portions of the MCCs and eliminating others. What the Working Group
has done is provide a foundational starting point for that process.
CONCLUSION
Litigation advanced against domestic retailers of goods produced
using supply-side forced labor has not proven successful in the court
system yet, but avenues for legal claims, such as the TVPRA or false
advertising claims seem to be gaining momentum. The claims raised
thus far rely on negligence, false advertising, ATS claims, and violations
of the TVPRA, which has an explicit extraterritorial jurisdictional
grant. The Ninth Circuit permitted the latest complaint alleging ATS
violations by child-slave-labor plaintiffs to survive, remanding it to the
district court with permission to amend the complaint. However, the
Supreme Court’s presumption against extraterritoriality may pose a
barrier to those claims. Nonetheless, these lawsuits do more than seek
money damages; they result in headlines and increased consumer
awareness, which later becomes publicized in the marketplace. Studies
have shown many consumers shop with a preference for goods not
sourced from forced labor or child labor.287 Domestic businesses that
buy from international suppliers should implement contractual
warranties and remedies to help guard against forced labor and child
labor in the supply chain. The Working Group has proposed a set of
MCCs designed to aid domestic companies in writing these contracts.
Part of those clauses include strong disclaimers, drafted with the intent
of shielding the domestic entity adopting the MCCs from increased
liability based on the contract. In light of the changing expectations of
consumers and evolving theories of liability (both contractual and
statutory), domestic buyers are well-advised to consider taking
significant action, including adoption of the MCCs, to detect and
remediate sources of abusive labor practices in their supply chains.

287. See, e.g., supra note 273.

